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Abstract

to collect, analyze and report data about individuals, households or businesses. Information systems,
therefore, contain confidential information such as social security numbers, income, credit ratings, type of
diseMe, customer purchases, etc.
The necessity to combine the confidentiality and the
legitimate needs of data users is imperative. Every
disclosure limitation method has an impact, which is
not always a positive one, on true data values and
relationships. Ideally, these effects can be quantified
so that their anticipated impact on the completeness
and validity of the data can guide the selection and
use of the disclosure limitation method.
The increasing capacity of storing large amounts
of data and the necessity to analyze them to support planning activities, have largely contributed to
the dlffusion of data mining technlques and related
methodologies. The elicitation of knowledge, that
can be attained by such techniques, hM been the focus of the Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD)
researchers' effort for years and by now it is a well
understood problem [1]. On the other hand, the impact of the information confidentiality originating by
these techniques has not been considered until very
recently.
The process of uncovering hidden patterns from large
databases was first indicated as a threat to database
security, by 0' Leary [2], in a paper presented in the
1st International Conference in Knowledge Discovery
and Databases. Piatetsky-Shapiro, in GTE Laboratories, was the chair of a mini-symposium on knowledge discovery in databases and privacy, organized
around the issues raised in 0' Leary's paper in 1991.
The focal point discussed by the panel was the lim-

Large repositories of data contain sensitive information which must be protected against unauthorized access. The protection of the confidentiality
of tills information has been a long-term goal for
the database security research community and the
government statistical agencies. Recent advances,
in data mining and machine learning algorithms,
have increased the disclosure risks one may encounter
when releasing data to outside parties.
A key problem, and still not sufficiently investigated,
is the need to balance the confidentiality of the disclosed data with the legitimate needs of the data
users. Every disclosure limitation method affects, in
some way, and modifies true data values and relationships. In tills paper, we investigate confidentiality
issues of a broad category of rules, which are called
association rules. If the disclosure risk of some of
these rules is above a certain privacy threshold, those
rules must be characterized as sensitive. Sometimes,
sensitive rules should not he disclosed to the public
since, among other things, they may be used for inferencing sensitive data, or they may provide business
competitors with an advantage.

1

Introduction

Many government agencies, businesses and non·profit
organizations in order to support their short and
long term planning activities, are searching for a way
'Contact Author: Vassilios S. Verykios, 3141 Chestnut
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101-2875. leI: 215-895-1532, fax:
215-895-2191, email: verykios@cis.drexel.cdu
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itation of disclosure of personal information, which
is not different in principle from the focal point of
statisticians and database researchers since, in many
fields like medical and socio-economic research, the
goal is not to discover patterns about specific individuals but patterns about groups.

section 2 we present an overview of the current approaches to the problem of DM and security. Section
3 gives a formalization of the problem, while some solutions are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses
performance and results obtained from the applications of the devised algorithms. Issues, concerning
The compromise, in the confidentiality of sensitive the implementation of the algorithms, are discussed
information that is not limited to patterns specific to in section 6. Concluding remarks and future extenindividuals, (that can also be performed by newly de· sions are listed in section 7.
veloped data mining techniques), is another form of
threat which is analyzed in a recent paper by Clifton 2
Background and Related Work
from Mitre Corporation and Marks from Department
of Defense [6]. The authors provide a well designed
The security impact of DM is analyzed in (6] and
scenario of how different data mining techniques can
be used in a business setting to provide business com- some possible approaches to the problem of inference
petitors with an advantage. For completeness pur- and discovery of sensitive knowledge in a data mining context are suggested. The proposed strategies
poses we describe the scenario below.
include fuzzyfying the source database, augmenting
Let us suppose, that we are negotiating a deal with the source database and limiting access to the source
Dedtrees Paper Company, as purchasing directors of database by releasing only samples of the original
BigMart, a large supermarket chain. They offer their data. Clifton in [7J adopts the last approach. In his
products in reduced price, if we agree to give them paper, he studies the correlation between the amount
access to our database of customer purchases. We ac- of released data and the significance of the patterns
cept the deal. Dedtrees now starts mining our data. which are discovered. He also shows how to deterBy using an association rule mining tool, they find mine the sample size in such a way that data mining
that people who purchase skim milk also purchase tools cannot obtain reliable results.
Green paper. Dedtrees now runs a coupon marketClifton and Marks in [6] also recognize the necessity
ing campaign saying that "you can get 50 cents oIr
of analyzing the various data mining algorithms in
skim milk with every purchase of a Dedtrees prodorder to increase the efficiency of any adopted stratuct". This campaign cuts heavily into the sales of egy that deals with disclosure limitation of sensitive
Green paper, which increases the prices to us, based
data and knowledge. The analysis of the data mining
on the lower sales. During our next negotiation with
techniques should be considered as the first step in
Dedtrees, we find out that with reduced competition
the problem of security maintenance: if it is known
they are unwilling to offer us a low price. Finally, we
which selection criteria are used to measure the sigstart to lose business to our competitors, who were
nificance of the induced patters it will be easier to
able to negotiate a better deal with Green paper.
identify what must be done to protect sensitive inThe scenario that has just been presented, indicates formation from being disclosed. While the solution,
the need to prevent disclosure not only of confiden- which is proposed by Clifton in [7], is independent
tial personal information from summarized or aggre- from any specific data mining technique, other regated data, but also to prevent data mining tech- searchers [8, 9] propose solutions that prevent discloniques from discovering sensitive knowledge which is sure of confidential information for specific data minnot even known to the database owners. We should ing algorithms such as association rule mining and
recognize though, that the access of a company like classification rule mining.
the Dedtrees, is in general worthwhile since it im- Classification mining algorithms may use sensitive
proves the efficiency of distribution, lowers the costs data to rank objects; each group of objects has a
and helps to predlct inventory needs, even if that description given by a combination of non-sensitive
gives to Dedtrees the benefit of reducing competition. attributes. The sets of descriptions, obtained for a
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: III certain value of the sensitive attribute are referred
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to as description space. For Decision-Region based
algorithms, the description space generated by each
value of the sensitive attribute, can be determined a
priori. The authors, in [8], first identify two major
criteria which can be used to assess the output of
a classification inference system and then use these
criteria in the context of Decision-Region based algorithms, to inspect and also to modify, if necessary,
the description of a sensitive object, so that they can
be sure that it's not sensitive.
Disclosure limitation of sensitive knowledge by data
mining algorithms, that are based on the retrieval of
association rules, has also been recently investigated
[9]. The authors, in [9], propose to prevent disclosure
of sensitive knowledge by decreasing the significance
of the rules induced by such algorithms. Towards this
end, they apply a group of heuristic solutions for reducing the number of occurrences, (also referred to
as support) of some frequent (large) groups of items,
which are selected by the database security administrator, below a minimum user specified threshold.
Because an association rule mining algorithm discovers association rules from large sets of items only, by
decreasing the support of the selected sets of items
has as a consequence that the selected rules escape
from the milling. This approach focuses on the first
step of the rules minlng process, which is the discovery of large itemsets. The second step of the same
process (e.g. the derivation of strong rules form frequent sets of items) is the starting point of the approach we will present in this paper.

set of transactions D). We say that the rule X ::::} Y
has support s if IX%Yl ~ s, where N is the number
of transactions in D. Note that while the support is
a measure of the frequency of a rule, the confidence
is a measure of the strength of the relation between
sets of items.
Association rule mining algorithms rely on support
and confidence when they are searching for implica·
tions among sets of items. In this way, algorithms
do not retrieve all the association rules that may be
derivable from a database, but only a very small subset that satisfies the requirements set by the users.
This is actually used as a form of search.ing bias, in
order for the mining algorithm to be computationally
more efficient.
An association rule-minlng algorithm works as follows. It finds all the sets of items that appear frequently enough, so as to be considered relevant and
then derive from them the association rules that are
strong enough to be considered interesting. We aim
at preventing some of these rules, that we refer to as
"sensitive rules", from being disclosed. The problem
can be stated as follows:

3

In [9] the authors demonstrated that solving this
problem (also referred to as "sanitization" problem)
is NP-hardj thus, we look for a transformation of D
(the source database) in D' (the released datab<U3e)
that maximizes the number of rules in R - Rh that
can still be mined.
There are two main approaches that can be adopted
when we try to hide a set Rh of rules: we can either
prevent the rules in Rh from being generated, by hiding the frequent sets from which they are derived, or
we can reduce th.eir confidence by bringing it below a
user-specified threshold (min_con/). In this paper we
propose three strategies to hide rules using the both
approach; work related to the former approach can
also be found in [9].

Given a database D, a set R of relevant
rules that are mined from D and a subset
Rh of R, how can we transform D into a
database D' in such a way that the rules in
R can still be mined, except for the rules in
Rh?

Problem Formulation

Let I = {i l , .. , in} be a set of literals, called items.
Let D be a database of transactions, where each
transaction T is an itemset such that T ~ I. A
unlque identifier, which we call it TID, is associated
with each transaction. We say that a transaction T
supports X, a set of items in I, jf X C T. We assume that the items in a transaction or an itemset,
are sorted in lexicographic order.
An association rule is an implication of the form
X ::} Y, where X C I, Y c I and X n Y = 0.
We say that the rule X ::::} Y holds in the database
D with confidence c if '1~C ~ c (where IAlis the
number of occurrences 0 t e set of items A in the
3

in some cases, this approach may not give results as
good as the ones one may get when using a dynamic
ABC
scheme, in which the list of rules to be hidden can
ABC
dynamically be reordered after each iteration.
ABC
The fourth assumption is based on the minimality of
AB
changes in the original database. By changing the
A
confidence or the support of each rule, one step at a
AC
time, we act proactively in minimizing the side-effects
of the hiding schemes.
The fifth assumption states that we hide only rules
Table 1: Database D
that involve disjoint sets of items. In a different situation, interactions among the rules (i.e., common
4 Proposed Solutions and Algo- subsets of items) should be considered beforehand.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: in
rithms
Section 4.1 we introduce the required notation, in
For the simplicity of presentation and without loss of Section 4.2 we introduce three strategies that solve
generality, we make the following assumptions in the the problem of hiding association rules, by tuning
development of the algorithms:
the confidence and the support of these rules, while
the building blocks of the algorithms that implement
• We hide association rules by decreasing either those strategies, are presented in Section -1.3.
their support or their confidence.

TID
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6

Items

4.1

• We select to decrease either the support or the
confidence based on the side effects on the information that is not sensitive.

Notation

Before presenting the solution strategies, we introduce some notation. Each database transaction is a
triple:

• We hide one rule at a time.

• We decrease eit.her the support or the confidence
one unit at a time.

t=<TID, list_oLelements, size>

• We hide only rules that are supported by disjoint
large Itemsets.

where TID is the identifier of the transaction t and
lisLaJ_elements is a list with one element for each
item in the database. Each element has value 1 jf the
corresponding item is supported by the transaction
and 0 otherwise. Size is the number of elements in
the list of elements having value 1 (e.g., the number
of elements supported by the transaction). For example, if 1= {A,B,C,D}, a transaction that contains
the items {A,C} would be represented as t=< TI,
[1010],2>.
According to this notation, a transaction t supports
an itemset S if the elements of t.lisLof_elements
corresponding to items of S are all set to 1. A
transaction t partially supports S if the elements of
t.lisLa/_eLements corresponding to items of S are not
all set to 1. For example, if S = {A,B,C} = [1110]
and p=< T1, [1010],2>, q=< T2, [1110], 3 > then
we would say that q supports S while p partially supports S.

According to the first assumption we can choose to
hide a rule by changing either its confidence or its
support, but not both. By using this assumption, we
can consistently evaluate each technique without any
interactions from other techniques.
The second assumption means that, in order to decrease the confidence or the support of a rule, either
we turn to 0 the value of a non-zero item in a specific
transaction, or we turn to 1 all the zero items in a
transaction that partially supports an itemset.
The third assumption states that hiding one rule
must be considered as an atomic operation. This
implies that the hiding of two different rules should
take place in a sequential manner, by hiding one rule
after the other. This assumption facilitates the analysis and the evaluation of the tecilniques. Note that
4

TID
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6

Items
111
111
111
110
100
101

Size
3
3
3
2
1
2

Itemset

A
D
C
AD
AC
DC
ADC

Support
100%
66%
66%
66%
66%
50%
50%

Table 2: Database D using the specified notation.

4.2

Table 3: The large itemsets from the database of
Table 1 along with their support.

The Three Hiding Strategies

Decreasing the support of an itemset S means selecting a transaction t that supports S and setting to 0 at
least one of the nOD-zero elements of l.lisLal-elements
that correspond to S. By choosing the minimum
number of elements to modify (Le., 1), we minimize
the impact of hiding a sensitive rule in the database.
In the example above, in order to decrease the support of S using q, we can turn to 0 the element corresponding to C, obtaining q=< T2, [1100], 2 >.
Increasing the support of an itemset S through a
transaction t that partially supports it, means setting
to 1 all the elements in t.lisLol_elements corresponding to items of S. The increase of the support of an
itemset that has the maximum number of elements
in common with the itemset S, also contributes to
minimizing the side-affects of hiding. Referring to
the example above, in order to increase the support
of S through p we must turn to 1 the element corresponding to the item B, obtaining p=< T1, [1110],
3 >.
Given a rule X => Y, we can write its confidence in
terms of its support as follows:

Con/(X => Y) =

(b) by decreasing the support of the rule consequent Y, in transactions that support both
X and Y.
2. We decrease the support of the rule
(a) by decreasing the support of either the rule
antecedent X, or the rule consequent Y.
Example
Supposing that we have the database D shown in
Table 1. According to the notation introduced above,
the representation of the database is given in Table
2). Given that min_supp=2j6=33% and min_con!=
70% we are interested in hiding the rule AC => B,
with support = 50%, and confidence = 75%.
Strategy l.a We select the transaction t=< T5,
[100j, 1 > and turn to 1 the element of the list of
item that corresponds to C. We obtain t=< T5,
[101], 2 >. Now, the rule AC => B has support=50%
and confidence=60%, which means that the rule has
been hidden since its confidence is below the min_coni
threshold.
Strategy l.b We select the transaction t=< T1,
[111 L3 > and turn to 0 the element of the list of items
that corresponds to B. The transaction becomes t=<
Tl, [101], 2 > and we obtain: AC => B with support=33% and confidence=50%, which means that
the rule is hidden.
Strategy 2.a We select the transaction t=< T1,
[111], 3 > and turn to 0 one of the elements in the
list of items that corresponds to A or to B or C. We
decide to set to a the element corresponding to C,
obtaining t=< T1, [110],2 >. The rule AC => B has
been hidden (support=33%, confidence=66%).

Supp(XuY)
Supp(X)

Starting from this relationship between the confidence and the support of a rule, we develop three
strategies to hide a rule:
1. We decrease the confidence of the rule

(a) by increasing the support of the rule antecedent X, through transactions that partially support it.

5

Rules
A=>C
A=>B
B=>A
B=>C
C=>A
C=>B
A=> BC
B => AC
C => AB
AB => C
AC => B
BC => A

Confidence
66%
66%

100%
75%
100%
75%
50%

75%
75%
75%
75%
100%

INPUT: a set Rh of rules to hide, the source
database D, the min_con! threshold, the
min..supp threshold

Support
66%
66%
66%
50%
66%
50%
50%
50%

OUTPUT: the database D transformed so
that the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach rule U in Rh do
{
repeat until (conf(U) <min~confJ
{
1. T = { t in D / l partially
supports fhs(U) }
2. count the rlUmber of items in each
transaction of T
3. sort lhe lransactions in T in
descending order of the number of
supported items
4. choose the transaction t E T
with the highest number of items
(the first transaction in T)
5. modify l to support Ihs(U)
6. increase the support of Ihs(U) by 1
7. recompute the confidence of U
}
8. remove U from Rh
)

50%

50%
50%
50%

Table 4: The rules derived from the large itemsets of
Table 3

4.3

Algorithms and Data Structures

We now prescnt the algorithms for the previously introduced strategies. For each algorithm we specify
the input and output requirements and we give a brief
description of the data structures needed.

End

4.3.1

Algorithm 1.a
Figure 1: Sketch of Algorithm l.a

This algorithm hides sensitive rules according to the
first strategy: for each selected rule, it increases the
support of the rule's antecedent until the rule confidence decreases below the min_con/threshold. Figure
1 shows the sketch of this algorithm; a refinement of
the algorithm is depicted in Figure 2. In both Figure
1 and 2 we used the compact notation Ihs(U) to represent the item set on the left side of a rule U (also
referred to as "rule antecedent").

4.3.2

on the right side of a rule (also referred as "rule consequent").

4.3.3

Algorithm 2.a

This algorithm decreases the frequency of the sensitive rules until either their confidence is below the
min_con! threshold or their support is below the
min_supp threshold. Figure 5 shows the sketch of algorithm 2.a; more details about the steps it requires
are given in Figure 6.

Algorithm l.b

Tltis algorithm hides sensitive rules in accordance to
the second of the proposed strategies. It reduces the
Performance Evaluation and
support of each selected rule by decreasing the fre- 5
quency of the consequent through transactions that
Analysis Results
support the rule. This process goes on until the rule
confidence is below the minimum threshold. Fjgure 3 We performed our experiments on a Dell workstation
and 4 show the building blocks of algorithm 1.b. The with P3 500 MHz processor and with 128 MB of
compact notation Ths( U) denotes the large itemset mam memory, under Solaris 2.6 operating system.
6

INPUT: a set Rh of rules to hide, the source
database D, the min_confthreshold, the
min..supp threshold

Begin

Foreach rule U in Rh do
{
While (conf(U) 2:: min~conf)
{
T = {t E D{ t partially supports Ihs(U)}
/1 c01Jnt how many items of lhs(U) are
/1 in each trans. of T

OUTPUT: the database D transformed so

that the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin

foreach transaction t in T do

Foreach rule U in Rh do
{
repeat until (conf(U) <min_conl)
{
1. T = { t in D { t supports U }
2. choose the transaction t in T
with the lowest number of items
3. choose the item j in rhs(U)
with the minimum impact OIl the
(Irhs(U)I- l)-itemsets
4. delete j from t
5. decrease the support of U by 1
6. recompute the confidence of U
)
7. remove U from Rh
}

{

t.num...itmes= 11[Hamming...d.ist(lhs(U),t..lisLoUtems)

)

1/ sori transactions

II order of n1Jmbcr

of T in descending
of items of lhs(U)

/1 contained

sort(T)

/1 pick the transaction of T
/1 highest n1Jmber of items

with the

t = T[l]

/1 set to one all the bits of t that
/1 represent items in lhs(U)
seLall..ones(t.lisLof...items,lhs(U))
,upp(lh,(U) )=,upp(lh,(U))+1
oouf(U)=,upp(U)/,upp(lh,(U))

End

Figure 3: Sketch of Algorithm l.b

}
End

1.5K, 2.5K, 4.2K, 5K, 6.7 K, 7.5K, 8K, 9K and 10K
respectively, for each tested value of III. Each one of
the generated databases has an average transaction
length of 5 items. Since we tested our algorithms for
4 different values of III (20, 30, 40 and 50 items), we
generated 4 groups (also referred to as "series") of 10
databases (one for each value of III). Details about
the characteristics of the datru>ets, used in our first
trial, are given in Table 5.
For the representation of the datasets in each series
we used the compact notation 10:[lk..10k] to indicate
that each series is made up of 10 databases and that
the size of each database lies in the range lk-IOk.
The parameter IRh[ in Table 5 indicates that in our
first trial we ran the proposed algorithms in order
to hide a set of 2 disjoint rules (randomly selected
among those having minimum confidence).
For the second trial, we used the first series of 10
datasets of Table 5 to hide sets of 2, 3 and 4 rules;
Table 6 shows the values of the parameters ]D[, III
and IRhl for our second trial. In the rest of this sec-

Figure 2: Refinement of Algorithm La

In order to generate the source databases, we made
use of the IBM synthetic data generator. The generator creates output files in text format, which can
be understood by the programs which implement our
heuristics. The input to the synthetic data generator,
among other parameters, is the database size (]DD,
the number of literals appearing in the database (lID
and the average number of items per transaction

(ATL).
We performed two trials for each of the three algorithms: the goal of the first trial was to analyze the
behavior of the developed algorithms when the number of literals appearing in the database increases;
the second trial aimed at studying the behavior of
the algorithms when the number of rules selected for
hiding (lRhl) increru>es.
For the first trial we generated 10 datasets of size 1](,
7

Begin
Foreach rule U in Rh do
{
While (conf(U) ;::: min_confJ
{
T = {t E Dj t supports U}
II sorl T in ascending order of

II
II

INPUT: a set Rh of rules to hide, the source
database D, the min_conf threshold, the
min-supp threshold

OUTPUT: the database D transformed so

that the rules in Rh cannot be mined
Begin
Foreach rule U in Rh do
{
repeat until (conf(U) <min_conf
or supp(U) <mln_supp)
{
1. T := { i in D j i supports U }
2. choose the transaction i in T
with the lowest number of items
3. choose the item j in U
with the minimum impact on the
(IUI- l)-itemsets
4. delete j from t
5. decrease the support of U by 1
6. recompute the confidence of U
)
7. remove U from Rh
}

size of the lransactions and choose
the one with the lowest size

t = choose_transaction(T)

II choose the item ofrhs(U)
II with the minimum impact on the
II (]rhs(u)I-l)-ite.msets
j = choose_item(rhs(U))

II set to zero the bit oft./isLof_iiems
II thai represents item j

seUo...zeroQ, t.lisLofJtems)
,upp(U)~,upp(U) - 1
oouf(U)~,u pp( U)/ ,upp(lh,( U))
}
End

Figure 4: Refinement of Algorithm l.b
Series
1
2
3
4

IDI
10'llk.. IOkj
10'llk.. IOkj
10'llk.. IOkj
10'llk.. IOkj

III
20
30
40
50

IRhl
2
2
2
2

End

ATL
5
5
5
5

Figure 5: Sketch of Algorithm 2.a

left side of Rj during the first execution of the inner
loop. We ran the experiments discussed at the beginning of this section using algorithm 1.a to hide 2
disjoint rules, under the constraint N(Rj) := 3. The
significance of ftxing the value of N(Rj) is to simTable 5: The datasets used in the first trial.
ulate the hypothesis that rules wiLh similar support
tion we will present a brief analysis for each one of and confidence are chosen for hiding in each dataset.
From Figure 9 and 10 we can easily observe that - unthe algorithms, followed by a discussion of the results
der the above constraint - our algorithm 1.a is linear
obtained from the above experiments.
in the size of the database and directly proportional
to III (Figure 9) and 10 IRhJ (Figure 10).

5.1

Analysis and Performance Evaluation
of Algorithm l.a

5.2

The time required by algorithm 1.a to hide a set of
rules Rh is O(l::N(R;)'{IDI'IIJ + IT;ll.logIT;lJ)),
where j ranges from 1 to IRhl, N(Rj) is the number of executions of the inner loop performed to hide
the rule Rj, IDI is the number of transactions in the
database, III is the number of literals in D and ITjll is
the number of transactions partially supporting the

Analysis and Performance Evaluation
of Algorithm 1.b

The
time
required
by
algorithm l.b is O(l:: N(R;)'{IDI'III + IT;ll.log IT;ll
+ Irhs(R;)I'III * IRI), where Irhs(R;)1 is the number
of literals in the itemset on the right side of the rule
Rj and j ranges from 1 to IRhl. We tested algorithm
8

Values of ITiI
for 111=50:md jRhI=2

Begin

8000.0

Foreach rule U in Rh do
{
While (conf(U) ~ min~conf

....... 7000.0

~

and supp(U) 2, min-supp)

't5

{

~

T = {t E DJ t supports U}

II sori Tin ascwding order of
/1 size of the transactions and choose
II the one with the lowest size
t = choose_transaction(T)

II choose the item of U
II with the minimum impact
II ~UI-l).itemsets

on the

c

5000.0
4000.0

g

c'

E-<

3000.0

't5
.§

2000.0

'"

1000,0
0.0
0.0

j = choose-.item(U)

II
II

5.3

}

10:[lk.. lOk]
10:[lk.. lOk]
10:[lk.. lOk]

20
20
20

2

3
4

II

~

2000.0

4000.0

6000_0

8000,0

10000,0

ITjll

for the last series of

Analysis and Performance Evaluation
of Algorithm 2.a

AJgmithm 2.• pe,forms in GO:: NCRj) * {IDI * III +
IT;ll * log IT;ll + IRjl * III * IRI}) time, whe,e IR;I is
the number of literals that appear in the rule Rj, IRI
is the number of rules that can be mined from the
database D and j ranges from 1 to IRkl. Figure 13
and 11 show the results of the trials discussed at the
beginning of this section, when using algorithm 2.a
to hide the rules. Again, if the same rules where chosen for hiding in each dataset, algorithm 2.a would
perform in a time directly proportional to the size
of the database. Its time requirements would also
increase linearly when increasing the number of literals appearing in the database or the number of rules
selected for hiding.

Fignre 6: Refinement of Algorithm 2.a

III IRhl

0

Figure 7: The values of
Table 5

End

IDI

0

Size of the database (in num. of trans.)

set to zero the bit of t.lisLof_items
that represents item j
seLto..zero(j, t.lisLoUtems)
supp(U)=supp(U) - 1
wnf(U) ='n pp (U) I ,u pp( Ih,(U) )

Series
1
2
3

c

6000.0

ATL
5
5
5

Table 6: The datasets used in the second trial.

l.b on the same datasets and under the same constraints used for algorithm l.a (no constraints were 6
Implementation Issues
imposed neither on IRI nor on Irhs(Rj)l). The results
of these experiments are shown in Figure 11 and 12. In Section 4.3 we introduced the following data struci,From these pictures we can see that the time of al- tures which are manipulated by the proposed algogorithm l.b is linear in the size of the database, and rithms:
in the number of literals that appear in the database
increase (Figure 11) and in the number of rules se• sets of transactions (D and T)
• set of rules (Rh)

lected for hiding (Figure 12). Notice also, that these
graphs indicate that algorithm l.a performs slightly
better than algorithm l.b.

• set of large itemsets (R)
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Values ofN(R)

Course of Algorithm l.a

for 111,=50 and IRhl;2

for N(R)=3 and IRh!=2

200.0 ,~~~~~~-~~~~~~-~-

100.0

-1JI=20
a--oll!=30
<>-----0
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---.:r [=50

]

'Z"

~

~

100.0
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9000.0
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0,0
2000,0
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6000.0
10000_0

Size of the database (in Dum. of trans.)

Size Df the database (in num. of trans.)

Figure 8: The values of N(Rj) for the last series of
Table 5
• list of items I, that appear in the database D.
We now give a brief description of how each data
structure has been implemented.
For the SET_OF-ELEMENTS data structure we
adopted the following implementation: each set ha.<>
been represented as an array of references to the elements of this set. These elements can be: transactions for D and T, rules for Rh and large itemsets for
R. The elements of a set have been represented as arrays. According to this convention, each transaction
t is an array, with one field storing the transaction
ill (TID), another one storing the list of Hems contained in a transaction and still another one storing
the number of these items. The list of items has
been implemented as a hash structure which has literals for keys and integers for values. The number
of keys equals I and the value associated with each
key is either 1 or 0, depending whether the literal is
supported by the transaction or not. The same implementation has been adopted tD represent the list
of Hems contained in a large Hemset, which turns
out to be an array with one field for the list of Hems
and one ftled storing the suppDrt. Each rule U has
been implemented as an array with 4 fields, storing
the confidence of the rule, a reference to the large
itemsets representing the rule antecedent and the rule
consequent and a reference to the large item set from

Figure 9: Results of the first trial

which the rule has been derived. Finally, to represent the list I of literals appearing in the database,
we used an array of strings.
Generation of the set T The set T of transactiDns
(partially) supporting a large itemset 1 is generated
by analyzing each transaction t in D and checking if
the list of items in the transactiDn equals the list of
Hems in large itemset (for algorithm l.a we check if
the items in t are a proper subset of l).
Computing the Hamming distance (Algorithm l.a) This fnnction computes the distance between two lists of items. Since we represented the
LIST_OF.lTEMS data structure as a hash structure
with III keys, each list has the same number of elements. For each literal (key), we compute the difference between the corresponding values, and add 1 to
the Hamming distance counter, if tills difference is 1.
Choosing the best transaction (Algorithm lob)
The decrease in the frequency of an itemset l, is made
through a transactiDn that minimizes the side-effects
in the remaining set of rules. This transactiDn is selected among the set of transactions that support l,
and it is the one with a minimum number of non-zero
items. To do this, we sort the set T in decreasing
order of size of transactions and then pick the first
transactiDn from T.
Choosing the best item (Algorithm lob) The
best item (in a large itemset l) to delete from a trans-
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Couse of Algorithm La

Course of Algorithm 1.a

for N(R)=3 and 111=20

for N(R)=3 and 1Rh1=2
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Figure 10: Results of the second trial

Figure 11: Results from the second trial

action t is chosen so to have the minimum impact on
the set of large itemsets. To do this, we determine all

the (Ill-l)-itemsets and pick one Item from (Ill-l)itemset with the lowest support.

7

[[1=20

~111=30

Conclusions

To protect sensitive rules from disclosure, two main
approaches can be adopted. We can either prevent
rules from being generated, by hidlng the frequent
sets from which they are derived, or we can reduce
their importance by setting their confidence below a
user-specified threshold. We developed three strategies that hide sensitive association rules based on
these two approaches. These strategies work either
on the support or on the confidence of the rules, by
decreasing either one of these until the rule is not
important.
Some assumptions have been made when developing
these strategies. We are currently considering ex·
tensions on these algorithms by dropping these assumptions. We also need to define some metrics to
measure the impact that our algorithms have on the
source database. Another interesting issue which we
will be investigating, is the applicability of the ideas
introduced in this paper to other data mining contexts, such as classification mining, clustering, etc.
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